Identified a multi-tenant isolation flaw and three payment-rail abuse paths before their SOC 2 Type II window closed. Retainer continued as continuous pentesting.
- 14
- Findings delivered
- 6 wks
- Kickoff to remediation
- 0
- Regressions post-fix
- 100%
- Auditor acceptance
The customer processes ~$4B annually across UPI, card, and wire rails. A SOC 2 Type II audit was five weeks out. Their in-house security team was two engineers, both embedded in the payments product.
A single-sprint PTaaS engagement with live findings, daily Slack syncs, and grey-box access to three critical services. Scope: the merchant API, the webhook signing service, and the reconciliation job runner.
A cross-tenant invoice read via a predictable object reference (BOLA). Two separate webhook-replay flaws. A reconciliation double-process that let the same SKU chargeback twice. None of the three were visible to SAST or scanners — they were business-logic chains.
14 findings opened. 0 regressed after fix. SOC 2 evidence package accepted by the auditor with zero follow-ups on the tested scope. Customer converted to a continuous retainer on week six.
